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1.     Introduction 
 
In the last few years a number of papers have emerged modeling the behavior of firms and 
trade unions and how they influence the strategic actions of the monetary authorities. 
Within this framework, particular attention has been paid to the impact which the formation 
of a monetary union might have on wage and price-setting behavior in an imperfectly 
competitive setting, and hence on central bank actions. 
There are two main strands to this literature. The first focuses on the implications for 
monetary policy if unions setting wages are inflation-averse (see Cubitt, 1992, Skott, 1997, 
Cukierman and Lippi, 1999a, Guzzo and Velasco, 1999, Soskice and Iversen, 2000, 
Coricelli et al., 2000a, Lawler, 2001). These models show that, whilst unions with 
monopoly power set wages above their competitive level, they moderate their wage 
demands to some extent in the face of the central bank’s (CB) actions. This is because 
unions realize that the CB will try to react to the high unemployment by generating higher 
inflation. As unions dislike inflation, they choose to moderate their wage push. This 
literature generates an interesting paradox: in theory it might be preferable to appoint   
“populist” or “more liberal” CB who is much more concerned about unemployment or 
output than inflation as this is what moderates union wage demands. In fact, there are 
additional features of these models, such as imperfectly competitive firms and stochastic 
disturbances, which to some extent offset the “liberal CB” result (see Coricelli et al. 2000a, 
and Lawler, 2001). The result can also be affected by the degree of competition between 
unions (see Cukierman and Lippi, 1999a) and different assumptions abut the “outside 
option” which unions face (Berger et al., 2001). 
  The second strand considers the impact on the union-CB game of the formation of a 
Monetary Union (MU). This can be modeled in a number of ways: 
(i)  As a change in the competitive conditions in the labor market (the number 
and size of unions) following the formation of the MU (Cukierman and Lippi, 199b, 
Calmfors, 1998, Coricelli et al., 2000 a,b).    2 
(ii)  As an increase in competition in goods markets (Coricelli et al., 2000b) and 
hence on labor markets. 
(iii)  As an increased incentive to undertake labor market reforms (especially in 
the European context, see Calmfors, 1998). 
(iv)  As a shift in the strategic interactions between CB and unions (Cavallari, 
2000, Coricelli et al.,2000b, Rantala 2001). 
In the contributions in (i) an (ii), the degree of wage-aggressiveness by unions is affected 
by the degree of decentralisation in labor markets, and the presence of non-atomistic firms, 
and hence the formation of a MU impacts on the equilibrium real wage and unemployment 
rate. By introducing these considerations, a stronger case can be made for a conservative 
CB to be put at the helm of the MU. In (iii) it is argued that the formation of the MU will 
induce labor market reforms. In (iv), the formation of the MU, by setting up a new CB, 
changes the incentive structure for the monetary authorities and therefore leads to changes 
in the strategic interactions with unions and firms. 
A crucial point to note is that almost all of the existing literature has chosen to explain 
wage settlements from factors external to the firm, such as inflation (cost of living) and the 
“big bad CB”, as opposed to “inside” or firm-specific factors. Then, the key strategic 
interaction is between the trade unions and the CB. The degree of wage pressure imposed 
by the unions is dependent on their perception of the trade-off in the CB’s preferences 
between the pursuit of an unemployment target and an inflation target. Firms only play a 
significant strategic role in the contributions of Coricelli et al. (2000a,b). But even in these 
models, the non-atomistic firms essentially exert an additional disciplining effect on unions, 
as wage-setters face a downward-sloping derived demand for labor in each sector. 
 In fact, most evidence from micro-economic data (see Gregory et al., 1985, Layard et al., 
1991) suggests that, possibly with exception of Scandinavian countries, factors internal to 
the firm, such as risk of redundancy or firm profitability do seem to matter in wage-setting. 
We therefore propose a model were inside factors are key variables in modeling wage-
setting. The model emphasizes how an important source of money non neutrality, which is 
the key result of the literature in this field, might hinge on the impact which unions 
perceives their actions have on employers as well as on the strategic interactions between   3 
unions and the CB. In our framework, firms are faced with the possibility of exit from the 
market following the realization of idiosyncratic shocks. Unions realize that firm exit has a 
negative impact on employment, and set their wages taking into account of the impact 
which their actions have on firms’ profitability. We show that, even in a version of the 
model where firms are atomistic, this disciplining effect is such that a more conservative 
CB exerts a moderating effect on wage settlements. In our view this result, which hinges on 
the unions’ concern for the variability of employment, is more realistic that models where 
unions’ concerns for inflation lead to a notion of a CB that is more liberal than society. 
Our model also has natural implications for EMU. Coricelli et al. (2000b) point out that,  
insofar as EU impacts on the elasticity of labor demand (through increased competition), it 
will tend to moderate wage claims. Our focus on the bankruptcy risk facing firms implies 
that, for any given degree of CB conservativeness, the loss of monetary policy sovereignty 
further moderates unions’ wage-setting behavior. As a result, we find that, ceteris paribus, a 
CB in a MU needs to be less conservative. The reason why this happens is twofold. On one 
hand the ECB will react to domestic shocks only to the extent that they modify 
macroeconomic conditions for the union as a whole. Therefore, unions will anticipate an 
increase in employment volatility. On the other hand, EMU monetary policy will react to 
shocks affecting other EMU members. To the extent that such shocks are not transmitted to 
the domestic economy, this will lead to a further increase in domestic volatility. Essentially 
our model falls into category (iv) of the models of MU and firm-union-CB strategic 
interactions highlighted previously: joining a MU modifies the nature of the trade-off 
facing the unions and affects their wag-setting behavior. In this sense, our results are akin 
to Cavallari (2000), but the source of the disciplining effect is different. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly survey the existing 
literature and set our approach in the context. In Section 3 we present our theoretical model. 
In Section 4 we consider the case of entry to a MU. Section 5 concludes. Some 
mathematical arguments are reported in the Appendix. 
 
 
   4 
2. Literature  Survey 
 
Models in this field mostly consider a two-stage game between a Rogoff-type central 
banker (CB) and a monopoly union (or a number of unions n). The typical union is 
assumed to care about the real wage received by its members and the deviations of 
unemployment among its members from a desired target level. In addition to that, several 
contributions (i.e. Cubitt, 1992 and 19995, Skott, 1997, Cukierman  and Lippi, 1999a, 
Coricelli et al. 2000a) also make the assumption that the union might be averse to inflation 
per se.
1 The union moves first and sets its wage taking as given the nominal wage of all 
other unions (if the model effectively considers the case of n > 1) and the reaction function 
of the CB. In the second stage, the CB takes nominal wages as given and chooses the rate 
of inflation so as to minimize a quadratic loss function defined over unemployment and 
inflation.  
Using this basic framework, Cukierman and Lippi (1999a) show that, where there is a 
single monopoly union with positive aversion to inflation, then social welfare is maximized 
by an ultra-liberal CB; that is, by a CB who does not care about inflation and is only 
concerned with unemployment stabilization. Intuitively, since the union dislikes inflation 
and the ultra liberal CB is ready to inflate at an extremely rate in response to even the 
slightest increase of unemployment above its natural rate, wages will be set at their 
competitive level so to maintain unemployment in equilibrium. The same logic extends to 
the case where there is more than one union: provided that n is not too large, then higher 
levels of social welfare are achieved with a CB that is more liberal than society, albeit not 
ultra-liberal. 
The “ultra-liberal CB” result is obtained also by Guzzo and Velasco (1999). Their 
analytical setting differ from the one adopted by Cukiermann and Lippi (1999a), but they 
                                                            
1 The issue of why the loss function of the union should include a term in inflation is not discussed in detail 
by many authors. Coricelli et al. (2000b) effectively consider the case where unions are not averse to inflation 
per se. Lawler (2001) suggests that unions’ inflation aversion might be justified by the fact that 
individual/social welfare functions include a term in inflation. The same point emerges in Guzzo and Velasco 
1998), who specify union utility as the sum of individual worker utilities. Berger et al. (2001) point out that , 
given that if the real wage already enters the loss function, then inflation aversion should only matter insofar 
as workers’ outside option (unemployment benefits or non-human wealth) are not indexed.  
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too assume that unions might be averse to inflation per se. However, whilst in Cukierman 
and Lippi the optimality of the ultra-liberal CB is determined only for the case of a 
monopoly union, in Guzzo and Velasco the result holds for n > 1. Lawler (2001) features 
the normative analysis of a model of strategic interaction between an inflation-averse 
monopoly union and a CB. As in Cukierman and Lippi (1999a), a case for an “ultra-liberal 
CB” emerges and it is essentially motivated by the same dynamics. The introduction of 
stochastic productivity shocks however moderates the “ultra-liberal CB” results. 
Coricelli, Cukierman and Dalmazzo (2000a) generalize the framework of Cukierman and 
Lippi to include : (i) price-setting firms
2 and (ii) a monetary authority that affects the price 
level and inflation only indirectly through its choice of money supply. The game has three 
stages. In the first stage, each of n unions chooses its nominal wage so to minimize its loss 
function. In doing that, each union takes the nominal wages of other unions as given and 
anticipates the reaction of the monetary authority and of firms to its wage choice. In the 
second stage, the monetary authority chooses the nominal stock of money so to minimize 
its Rogoff-type loss function. The CB takes the wage choices of unions as given and 
anticipates the pricing reaction of firms. In the third stage, each firm sets the price to 
maximize real profits. In doing that, firms take money supply and wages as given. 
A key results obtained by Coricelli et al. (2000a) is that when there is more than one union 
and unions care sufficiently more about unemployment among their members than about 
inflation, then an “ultra-conservative” CB is able to reduce inflation and aggregate 
unemployment to their minimal possible levels. The result hinge on the fact that a more 
conservative CB reduces money supply in response to a wage push and this worsens the 
consequences of wage aggressiveness for unemployment. Unions that are sufficiently 
averse to unemployment relative to inflation will be thus forced to moderate their wage 
demands, so that both inflation and unemployment will remain low. The special case of n = 
1 however restores the optimality of the “ultra-liberal” CB. 
                                                            
2 See also Soskice and Iversen (2000). 
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As noted in the introduction, the impact of a monetary union (MU) on union-firm-CB 
strategic games has been modeled in different ways.
3 Adopting the same framework as 
Cukierman ad Lippi (1999a), Cukierman and Lippi (1999b) interpret the formation of MU 
as an increase in the number of unions n. A larger n then implies that each union 
internalizes a smaller fraction of the inflationary effects of its wage demands and hence it 
tends to become more aggressive. This effect is however partially offset by the increased 
competition among unions which follows from the increase in labor mobility that is 
associated with the formation of a MU.  
Coricelli et al. (2000b) extend the setting of Coricelli et al. (2000a) to investigate open 
economy interactions. The formation of the MU has a twofold effect in their model: (i) it 
reduces the size of each firm and (ii) it increases the degree of competition in product 
markets and hence in labor market. As in Cukierman and Lippi (1999b) the first effect 
works in the sense of increasing wage aggressiveness and therefore inflation and 
unemployment. The second effect instead works in the opposite direction: stronger 
competition implies that for any increase in the wage demanded by a generic union, the 
increase in unemployment among union’s members is greater. Furthermore, when a union 
demands higher wages for its members, the aggregate price level in the MU goes up. This 
reduces real money balances and depresses average unemployment. A sufficiently 
conservative CB will react to the wage push by reducing the nominal stock of money, thus 
further reducing employment in the MU. It then follows that with a more conservative CB, 
expected inflation and unemployment are lower.  
In Cavallari (2000) the formation of a MU gives rise to a change in the nature of the game 
between firms, unions and CB. More specifically, the switch from a regime of 
uncoordinated monetary policies to a MU with a common monetary policy induces wage 
setters to behave less aggressively, provided that the unified CB is not too conservative. 
This result follows from the fact that unions correctly perceive in the new regime the 
stronger incentive that the single CB has to generate surprise inflation. In the uncoordinated 
                                                            
3 The strand of the literature that interprets the formation of a MU as an increased incentive to undertake labor 
market reforms (see Calmfors, 1998) is not surveyed here as labor market reform has not been fully integrated 
into game-theoretic models of CB-union interactions. 
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game, national CBs are  restrained from generating surprise inflation due to the exchange 
rate costs associated with unilateral monetary expansions. However, these costs disappear 
when the MU is formed and monetary policy delegated to a common CB. Thus, for any 
given level of conservativeness, the inflationary bias of the common CB is higher. This in 
turn makes unions more moderate. On the other hand, the model also incorporates a 
strategic effect analogous to the one discussed by Cukierman and Lippi (1999b). Which of 
the two effects prevails then depends upon the degree of conservativeness of the CB. When 
the common CB is sufficiently liberal, the wage moderation effect prevails, but this might 
be not enough to compensate for the higher inflationary bias, so that equilibrium inflation 
in the MU would be higher than under the uncoordinated monetary policy regime. Cavallari 
suggests that if supra-national unions are created that are able to internalize the higher 
incentive to accommodate wage inflation of the single CB, then an equilibrium with lower 
inflation an be achieved. This is because a less conservative CB increases the inflationary 
awareness of the supra-national union to a sufficient extent to compensate for the increased 
inflationary bias. 
Rantala (2001) focuses on the strategic effects of the change in environment for labor 
unions. The formation of a MU implies that unions interact with a common CB (rather than 
with national CBs) that has only one policy instrument available. This means that the 
monetary response to unilateral wage increases in one country will be necessarily 
symmetric. Furthermore, as in Cavallari (2000), the common CB internalizes the real 
exchange rate effect of expansionary monetary policies and this increases its degree of 
inflationary bias. Faced with this new environment for monetary policy, unions will adapt 
their behavior. The characterization of the final equilibrium will depend upon the degree of 
conservativeness of the common CB. In particular, union-wide employment increases 
(relative to the case where countries do not join in a MU) only if the common CB is 
sufficiently conservative. Inflation instead certainly higher in the MU for al values of the 
degree of conservativeness of the CB. 
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3. Model set-up 
 
The model describes the interactions among three players: firms, unions and Central Bank 
(CB). The preferences, payoffs and constraints that characterise each of them are described 
below. Then, the equilibrium outcome of these interactions is characterised. 
 
3.1   Firms and the aggregate economy 
 
The economy consists of N firms. The production function of generic firm i is specified as 
a Cobb-Douglas augmented by a firm-specific shock zi: 
 
(1)   i z
i i K AL Y exp ) 1 ( α α − =  
 
where Y, L, K denote output, labor input and capital input respectively and A and α  are two 
positive parameters. 
The firm-specific shock can be decomposed into a systematic component (z) and an 
idiosyncratic component (xi). For analytical tractability of the model, both z and xi are 





+]. The variance of the systematic component z is denoted by σ z
2. Firm profits are given 
by: 
 
(2)  C WL P Y i i − − = Π  
 
where P is the unit price of output, W is the unit price of labor and C denotes debt service 
payments. We do not explicitly model the liability side of firms bank sheets. We simply 
assume that a debt contract exists for each firm and that the amount of debt is identical for 
each firm. That is, the amount of debt service payments in this model is identical across 
firms.    9 
Firms operate as long as profits are non-negative. From equation (2) the operativity-
condition is thus: 
 








The model is then log-linearised around a non-distortionary steady state. (see the Appendix 
for details).  
Labor input li is defined from the first order condition for the maximization of firm’s 
profits: 
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and, from equation (4), total production is given by: 
 









Substituting (5) and (6) into (4) and then re-arranging terms we can express the operativity-
condition in terms of realizations of the idiosyncratic components of the shock zi: 
 
(6)  () ( ) ( ) i x z p c p w ≤ − − − + − α α 1 
 
We assume that the pre-determined wage w is defined as expected inflation (p
e) plus a 
bargained mark-up set by the union: 
 
(7)  e p w w + = ˆ  
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By the same token, we assume that debt service payments are pre-determined
4 and set as: 
(8) 
e p c c + = ˆ  





























where x* is the value of xi that satisfies condition (8) as an equality. 
Equation (9) states that the risk of bankruptcy (that is, the inverse of the probability of 
survival) increases for negative realization of the stochastic component z and the higher the 
bargained mark-up decided by the union and decreases the greater the extent of surprise 
inflation. Thus, both the union and the CB affect the probability of survival through their 
strategic behavior. In particular, it is clear that a more aggressive union ceteris paribus 
lowers  q. The argument we propose is that CB conservativeness affects employment 
variability through its impact on the probability of survival and therefore induces wage 
moderation in a volatility averse union. 
 
3.2 Central Bank 
 
The CB is assumed to follow an “implicit” Taylor rule of the type: 
 
(10) 
* χ α +
− = −
z
p p e  
 
                                                            
4 Our assumption is simply that debt interest payments are indexed to take account of inflation. Clearly in a 
richer model this might depend on the monetary regime, but as our focus is not how the liability side of the 
firms’ balance sheet evolves over the cycle this is left for further research. Note that we assume that, if a firm 
cannot meet interest payments it exits and industry and that c ˆ is predetermined. Again, in a richer model one 
might model how debt interest payments vary over the cycle and whether firms can borrow to meet existing 
payments. However, there will be some level of interest payments which will have to be met if the firm is to 
continue to operate. In our model this is given exogenously and does not vary with any of the exogenous 
shocks. This assumption is sufficient for the conclusions of the model to hold.   11
where χ * is a non-negative weight that reflects the degree of inflation aversion of the CB 
and p
e denotes the rational expectation taken over p 
5 
The theoretical literature on central banking has shown that a monetary rule such as (10) 
can be obtained as the reaction function of a CB whose objective is the minimization of 
quadratic loss function defined over output and inflation. As a matter of fact, in the 
Appendix we  derive equation (10) starting from an objective function for the CB specified 
as L
CB = (1/2)[y
2 + χ p
2]. In this case the parameter χ * in (10) is proportional to the degree 
of conservativeness χ ; that is, ∂χ */∂χ  > 0.  
The clear implication of (10) is that the degree of conservativeness affects the probability of 
survival q. Its effect depends on the sign of z. For negative realizations of the shock, a more 
conservative CB pursues a less expansionary monetary policy and hence reduces the 
probability of survival. For positive realizations of the shock, instead, the conservative CB 
takes a less restrictive monetary stance relative to a more liberal banker (focused on output 
stabilization) and the consequence is a greater probability of survival.  
Associated with the effect on the probability of survival is the effect that CB has on the 
variance of aggregate employment. As intuitively discussed below (and more formally in 
the Appendix) an increase in the degree of conservativeness implies, for any state of the 
world, a greater variance of employment. The consequence is that if the union is volatility 
averse, then it can decide to moderate wage demands to compensate for the increased 




We assume centralized wage setting behavior. The monopoly union bargains the wage w ˆ  
so to maximize its utility function, taking into account the reaction of the CB as 
summarized by the Taylor rule (10). In the literature, several different forms have been 
proposed for the objective function of the union. As just mentioned, the disciplining 
                                                            
5 It is straightforward to re-write (10) into a standard Taylor rule. That is why we define the monetary rule as 
“implicit” Taylor rule. 
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channel we intend to investigate builds on the costs that higher CB conservativeness 
implies in terms of employment variability for a volatility averse union. For this reason we 
simply let the utility of the union be a function of the bargained wage and of the variance of 
employment. We therefore abstract from the assumption that the union is averse to inflation 
per se and hence from the analysis of the associated disciplining mechanisms (as discussed 
in Section 2, this is extensively done in a number of existing contributions). Our union thus 
maximizes: 
 
(11) ) ( ˆ l Var w LU ψ − =  
 
where ψ  is a non-negative parameter. 
The objective function incorporates a fundamental trade off. On the one hand, the union is 
tempted to increase its wage demands so to raise the first term on the right hand side. On 
the other hand, a greater bargained wage increases employment variability and, for any 
given degree of CB conservativeness and state of the world, the union bears larger costs 
represented by the increase of the second term on the right hand side. The equilibrium is 
determined by the first order condition for the maximization problem 
  
3.4.  Wage discipline effect of CB conservativeness 
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The equilibrium bargained wage is inversely correlated to the degree of CB 
conservativeness. As χ * increases, the denominator of the first term on the right hand side 
goes up, whilst the denominator of the second term on the same side goes down (notice in 
fact that the partial derivatives of l
e and q
e are negative). However, since the second term 
has a minus in front, the overall effect is unambiguous and the equilibrium value of w ˆ  is 
smaller the more conservative the CB. 
The reason why conservativeness has a wage moderation effect is that, from the point of 
view of the union, the more conservative the CB is, the higher the costs associated to 
volatility of employment for any given state of the world (that is, realization of the shock). 
Not surprisingly, the effect of an increase in the degree of conservativeness on the 
bargained wage is smaller the smaller ψ : a union that cares relatively less about volatility is 
not willing to trade-off a lower bargained wage for more stability. Notice also that an 
increase in the variance of the stochastic parameter reduces the bargained wage and this 
effect is stronger the more averse to volatility the union is and the more conservative the 
CB is. The intuition for this result is again that the union moderates its wage demands to 
compensate the effect in terms of employment variability of an increase in the variance of z. 
If the union faces an already consistent source of volatility, such as a more conservative 
CB, and/or it is highly averse to volatility, then the incentive to moderate wage demands is 
stronger. 
 
4.  The formation of a monetary union 
 
We model entry in a monetary union by assuming that the monetary rule for the common 








p p e  
 
where z* = µ z + λ  and µ  < 1, λ  > 0.   14
According to (13), the common CB reacts to a union-wide shock z* which is only partly 
correlated with the country-specific shock z. The intuition underlying the specification of 
the union-wide shock can be given as follows. Party of the domestic-economy shock (1-µ ) 
is purely asymmetric, i.e. it has a counterpart of opposite sign occurring elsewhere in the 
union, so that the common CB does not react to it. In addition, the common CB reacts to 
shocks elsewhere in the Union, which do not affect the domestic economy. This latter 
reaction represents a source of monetary policy disturbance for the domestic country and it 
is represented by the random variable λ . By assumption, λ  is uniformly distributed with 
zero mean, supports -λ
+ and λ
+ and variance equal to σ λ
2. 
The objective function of the union is still represented by equation (11) and the first order 
condition for its maximization yields the following solution for the bargained wage (see 
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Inspection of equations (12) and (14) reveals that the equilibrium bargained wage in the 
monetary union is smaller for any degree of CB conservativeness (again see the Appendix 
for algebraic details). The intuition is that entry in the monetary union entails a loss of 
monetary policy stabilization and adds a source of disturbance. Both effects work in the 
sense of increasing employment variance and therefore contribute to reinforce the wage 
moderation result. It thus follows that, ceteris paribus, the common CB in a monetary 
union needs to be less conservative(than in a regime of uncoordinated monetary policies) to 
obtain a given wage moderation effect. 
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5. Conclusions and directions of future research. 
 
We presented a model of union-firms-central bank interactions and inflation. Its distinctive 
feature is that firms face a positive probability of death following the realizations of an 
idiosyncratic supply shock. The exit of firms is a source of employment fluctuation that the 
union tries to stabilize. This in turn leads to a moderation of wage demands. The union 
discipline effect is stronger the more conservative the central bank. We modeled the 
formation of a monetary union as an increase in the probability of each firm’s death. This 
follows from the observation that, due to asymmetric shocks across EMU members, 
entering the union entails a loss of monetary stabilization policies. Faced with this higher 
risk of bankruptcy, the union further moderates its wage demands for any given degree of 
central bank conservativeness. Both the two fundamental results of this exercise are 
obtained under plausible sufficient conditions concerning the size of the parameters of the 
model. 
The analysis we proposed has interesting and innovative implications. In particular, it 
appears that the formation of the EMU can induce wage moderation and hence lower 
inflation without the need to make the degree of conservativeness of the ECB dramatically 
higher than the one of national monetary authorities. On the contrary, the increased 
probability of death that firms face once monetary policy is delegated to the common 
central bank implies that ceteris paribus, this common central bank does not need to be 
more conservative.  
The work can be extended in a number of ways. First of all, we focused on a single 
monopoly union. The obvious question to address next is how results change when a 
decentralized wage setting behavior is assumed. At first glance, the key mechanism of our 
model should still operate and unions would moderate their wage demands in response to a 
positive probability of firms’ death. However, in a decentralized setting, the presence of a 
competition effect may make results less linear than in the monopoly union case. Second, it 
would be interesting to incorporate the positive-profit constraint directly into the utility 
function of the unions. More generally, a micro-founded version of the model might yield   16
additional insights, especially concerning the possibility for players to use wage indexation 
as an instrument. 
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Appendix 
 
A1. The model expressed in deviations from non distortionary steady state. 
 
Derivation of  condition (4). Start with the level equation: 
 




        ( A 1 )  
 
Assuming a steady state where profits are zero
6: 
 
        = WL+C YP         ( A 2 )  
 
and log-linearising  we get 
 








Then, we assume that in (1) 
) 1 ( α − AK is constant and normalized at 1. The first-order condition for the profit-









α α     (A4)    
 
Taking logs and considering only deviations from steady state values, yields: 
 
i z l p w + − = − ) 1 (α     (A5)    
 
Correspondingly, output deviations from steady state amount to: 
i z l y + = α           (A6) 
                                                            
6 For simplicity we assume that all firms’ liabilities take the form of debt.    18
From (A5) and (A6) we obtain (4) and (5) in the text. Substituting (A5) and (A6) into (A3) 
and rearranging, we get  
() ( ) ( ) i z p c p w − ≤ − − + − α α 1  (A7) 
taking into account that  i i x z z + = , and substituting (7) and (8) into (A7) we obtain the 
probability of firm survival (9). 
 
 
A2. Definition of employment variance and first order condition of the union in the basic 
(no monetary union) case. 
 
The variance of employment is formally defined as: 
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+ are the supports of the distribution of z. 
From the definitions of l and q and their expected values it is possible to write: 
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Substituting (A7a) and (A7b) into (A6) and re-arranging terms we have:   19
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Solving the integral yields the following definition for the variance: 
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where σ z
2 is the variance of the stochastic component z. 
Notice that the variance is increasing in the bargained wage. An increase in the degree of 
conservativeness increases the first term on the right hand side, but also reduces the second 
term on the same side. However, from the point of view of the union, this second term is 
completely exogenous and does not influence its wage-setting behavior. Thus a more 
conservative CB makes the union more willing to moderate the wage in order to 
compensate the positive effect that conservativeness has on employment volatility. 
The equilibrium on the trade-off incorporated in the utility function of the union (equation 
(11) in the text, is found by solving the maximization problem. The first order condition is 
specified as: 
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To obtain equation (12) in the text it is then sufficient to substitute l
e and q
e with their 
definitions expressed as functions of the bargained wage, isolate the bargained wage on the 
right hand side and make use of the two following relations: 
 



















To formally evaluate the impact of CB conservativeness of the equilibrium bargained wage 
w ˆ  we need to consider the sign of the derivative of (12) with respect to χ *. To do this, first 
re-write (12) as follows: 
 

































































The derivative of the first term with respect toχ * is certainly negative. The derivative of the 
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After substituting for the definitions of  1
~ ρ  and  2
~ ρ  (from equation A7a and A7b) it appears 
that the first term on the right hand side (the term outside square brackets) is positive whilst   21
the second term (inside square brackets) is negative, since it reduces to (α/α+χ∗ )[α−1] . The 
derivative is thus unambiguously negative: CB conservativeness induces wage moderation. 
 
A3  Employment variance and first order condition of the union in the monetary union 
case. 
 
In the case of a monetary union, where the common CB operates according to the Taylor 
rule (13), employment variance is defined as follows: 
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+ are the supports of the distribution of λ . 
 
Note that the third term of the definition of the variance does not include the bargained 
wage. This implied that we do not need to make the covariance explicit. The variance can 
be thus defined as: 
   22
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2 is the variance of the shock λ . 
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By substituting for q
e and l
e in equation (A17) and making use of (A12a) and (A12b) when 
re-arranging terms the first order condition can be re-expressed in terms of the bargained 
wage as follows: 
 






































































Equation (14) in the text is the obtained by re-arranging terms in (A18). 
To evaluate the impact of entry in the monetary union on wage demands we compare the 
equilibrium bargained wage obtained for the monetary union case (equation (14)) with the 
equilibrium bargained wage in the basic (non monetary union) case (equation (12)). The 
difference between the two can be written as follows: 
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The first term on the right hand side is unambiguously negative. The second term (call it ∆) 
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The terms inside round brackets are both positive. Since the partial derivatives of both l
e 
and q
e are negative, this implies an overall positive sign for the numerator Ν . However 
recall that in equation (A19), the term ∆ has a minus in front, so that its overall sign is 
negative. In the end, the difference in equation (A19) is the sum of two negative terms and 
it is therefore negative. This means that  MU w w ˆ ˆ >  and hence that the formation of a 
monetary union has a wage moderation effect. As noted in the text, this follows from the 
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